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Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of
Entrapment
Bennett L. Gershman-
The government's undercover adventure known as "Abscam"-or mis-
adventure, depending on one's point of view-is now history. Every public
official brought to trial has been found guilty. The courts have passed on
the propriety of the government's conduct and, with the exception of a few
dissenting judges, have given their imprimatur both to the general opera-
tion and the particular techniques used.2 Moreover, since the trap success-
fully ambushed highly-placed individuals, the government's undercover
methods have been subjected to close scrutiny by Congress and the public
as well.3
t Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Cornell University; Professor of Law, Pace University.
This Article is dedicated to Judge James D. Hopkins, and to my wife, Professor Judith Koffler, for
all her help.
1. The word is an acronym combining the first two letters of Abdul Enterprises, Ltd., a fictitious
Middle Eastern corporation, and the word "scam," a slang expression for a swindle or confidence
game. The New York office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) created the organization in
1978 as a front to receive stolen property. In 1979, the agents shifted their attention to uncovering
political corruption, first in New Jersey, then among members of Congress. During this phase of the
investigation, Abdul Enterprises was transformed into a company of Arab sheiks seeking to invest in
or emigrate to the United States. See United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1209-11 (E.D.N.Y.
1981), afl'd, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982); American Civil Liberties Union, The Lessons of Abscam
(Oct. 10, 1982) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as ACLU Report].
2. See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 906
(1982); United States v. Williams, 529 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-
1111 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 1982); United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), af/'d,
692 F.2d 823 (2nd Cir. 1982). Contra United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1982),
appeal docketed, No. 82-1660 (D.C. Cir. June 15, 1982).
3. See, e.g., FBI Undercover Guidelines: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Undercover Hearings]; SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY UNDERCOVER ACTIVITIES OF COM-
PONENTS OF THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. NO. 682, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982);
HOUSE COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, IN THE MATTER OF REPRESENTATIVE RAY.
MOND F. LEDERER, H.R. REP. NO. 110, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); HOUSE COMM. ON STANDARDS
OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, IN THE MATrER OF REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL J. MYERS, H.R. REP. No.
1387, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Chevigny, A Rejoinder, NATION, Feb. 23, 1980, at 204; Wilson,
The Changing FBI-The Road to Abscam, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1980, at 3.
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Seen as public theater, Abscam cast the three branches of government
in a morality play whose plot called for the portrayal of disguised heroes
and hidden villains, intricate charades with racial overtones, and lavish
scenery against which invitations to corruption set the characters in mo-
tion. The federal undercover investigative apparatus combined massive
personnel and financial resources with overwhelmingly tempting induce-
ments, all in an effort designed expressly to test the honesty of high-rank-
ing members of a coordinate branch of government.4 Was Abscam, as its
proponents argue, a fair investigation employing accepted crime-fighting
techniques, albeit on a large scale and in an unconventional manner, to
root out corruption? Or was Abscam, as its critics contend, a pernicious
contrivance, using foul means not to prevent crime, but to create it?
These complex and disturbing moral and philosophical questions were
resolved by the courts under settled legal principles governing the doctrine
of entrapment. This Article suggests that those principles were inadequate
to stem the controversy surrounding the Abscam convictions because the
principles did not permit an examination of the propriety of the means
used by government agents to create the Abscam crimes. Some jurists con-
tend that the entrapment defense should restrain abuses of power by judg-
ing the investigative techniques against an objective standard of permissi-
ble governmental conduct.' In most states and in the federal courts where
the Abscam defendents were tried, however, entrapment is measured by a
subjective standard requiring the government to show that the defendant
was "predisposed" to respond criminally to undercover government
inducements. 6
4. During the course of the investigation, government agents produced a display of almost limit-
less riches to impress and entice their targets: lavish parties aboard a luxurious yacht, see United
States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1982), expensive townhouses and hotel suites for en-
tertainment, transportation by private jet and chauffeur-driven limousines, and a bank account deposit
of four hundred million dollars, see United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1193 (E.D.Pa.
1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 906 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453-59 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
Justice Roberts argued that the entrapment inquiry should focus on the government's methods of
investigation rather than on the defendant's culpability and that the government should be forbidden
from planning and activating the commission of a crime for the sole purpose of obtaining a victim to
be prosecuted and punished. "IT]he consummation of so revolting a plan ought not to be permitted by
any self-respecting tribunal." Id. at 454-55. Justice Frankfurter expressed similar concerns in Sher-
man v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), where he stated that the
judicial inquiry should focus on "whether police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below
standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of government power." Id. at 382.
For a summary of the minority or "objective" view of entrapment, see W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTr,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 48, at 371-72 (1972).
6. See W. LAFAvE & A. SCOT, supra note 5, § 48, at 371. The majority, or "subjective," entrap-
ment defense has two parts. To succeed with an entrapment defense, the defendant first must show
that the government "instigated," "lure[d]," "repeatedtly] and persistent[ly] solicit[ed]," or "[took] ad-
vantage of [the defendant's] sentiment." Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932). Once the
defendant produces some evidence of improper inducement, the government must then demonstrate
that the defendant was "predisposed" to commit the crime. See United States v. Sherman, 200 F. 2d
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Part I of this Article surveys the development of these competing
threads of entrapment theory. Part II shows how these theories were ap-
plied in the Abscam prosecutions. Part III turns to the predisposition test
and demonstrates its analytical flaws and its ineffectiveness in restraining
the improper use of inducements in undercover investigations. Part IV
offers specific suggestions for a federal entrapment statute to remedy these
defects. The statute allows an entrapment defense where the undercover
techniques used fall outside a narrowly defined range of permissible con-
duct. If the government's conduct is permissible, the statute nevertheless
requires the decision-maker to examine whether the decision to focus an
investigation on a defendant was based on a "reasonable suspicion" that
the individual was engaged in criminal activity. The advantages of such a
statute are twofold. It clearly limits the executive's investigative powers,
and it involves the judiciary more fully in checking investigatory excesses.
I. Two Visions of Entrapment Theory
Although virtually all judges [agree] that an innocent person who
was 'entrapped'. . . into committing a criminal act should not be
convicted, there is less agreement on the proper principles underlying
the concept. . . and on what factors. . . constitute entrapment.
Federal District Judge George Pratt
in United States v. Myers.'
Judge Pratt's lament echoes a debate that has endured as long as the
entrapment doctrine itself-whether the entrapment defense should focus
on the government's investigative techniques or the individual's culpabil-
ity-and that has created confusion if not incoherence.8 The battle lines in
880, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1952) (L. Hand, J.). In identifying the absence of predisposition, courts have
examined whether the defendant had "no previous disposition to commit [the crime]," was an "indus-
trious, law-abiding citizen," had no "criminal design," or was "an innocent person" against whom the
government "originated" the "criminal design" and then "implantfed] in the mind of [the] innocent
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense." Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42
(1932).
7. 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1219 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), atfd, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982).
8. For many years, jurists and scholars have pointed out the doctrine's incoherence. See Sherman
v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (characterizing entrapment
decisions as lacking a "formulated basis in reason"); United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d
Cir. 1933) (L. Hand, J.) (stating that entrapment decisions lack "definite doctrine"); Mikell, The
Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 245, 263 (1942) (noting that
doctrine lacks "rational basis"); Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: The Constitutional
Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942, 943 (1965) (characterizing entrapment defense
as a "failure").
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this dispute were draln in 1928 in Casey v. United States.' In Casey, the
Supreme Court considered the appeal of a lawyer convicted of smuggling
narcotics into a prison. Government agents, suspecting that Casey was
smuggling drugs, had arranged for an inmate to approach Casey and ask
him for narcotics. After Casey delivered the contraband, he was arrested.
The majority declined to scrutinize the tactics used, since the entrapment
defense had never been raised by the defendant.10 But the opinion in-
cluded language that indicated approval of the investigation, pointing out
that the plot to entrap Casey was no different from "ordering a drink of a
suspected bootlegger.""1 Justice Brandeis strongly disagreed. In a cele-
brated dissent, he distinguished situations in which the government in-
volves itself in an ongoing criminal endeavor from those in which the gov-
ernment actually creates the crime. "The Government may set decoys to
entrap criminals," he argued, "[blut it may not provoke or create a crime
and then punish the criminal, its creature." 2 Brandeis was less concerned
with providing a defense for unwary criminals than with protecting the
courts from becoming unwilling parties in the prosecution of individuals
whose crimes were induced by governmental officials. To achieve this
goal, Brandeis insisted that the government should initiate a "sting" oper-
ation only when it had a sufficient factual basis to believe that the defen-
9. 276 U.S. 413 (1928). While Casey stands as the point at which a strong divergence in entrap-
ment theory first appeared, it was not the first time the Supreme Court had addressed the issue. The
Court discussed entrapment nearly a century ago in the Decoy Letter Cases. See Price v. United
States, 165 U.S. 311 (1897); Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420 (1896); Rosen v. United States
161 U.S. 29 (1896); Goode v. United States, 159 U.S. 663 (1895); Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S.
604 (1895). In those cases, defendants found guilty of using the mails to distribute obscene materials
across state lines challenged their convictions on the ground that the contraband in question had been
solicited by undercover government agents. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions without spe-
cifically discussing an entrapment defense. The Court distinguished, however, legitimate and illegiti-
mate law enforcement objectives, noting that "it does not appear that it was the purpose to induce or
solicit the commission of a crime, but [rather] it was to ascertain whether the defendant was engaged
in an unlawful business." Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 610 (1895) (emphasis added).
Twenty years later, in Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915), the Ninth Circuit
looked to this language to strike down a conviction. There, government agents suspected that the
defendant had knowledge of a scheme by which illegal aliens were brought across the Mexican border
into the United States. To force him to divulge the desired information, the agents sought to charge
him with a related criminal offense. Thus, they repeatedly asked Woo Wai and others to help trans-
port aliens across the border. The defendant refused these requests on several occasions but finally
assented. The court found that the government's conduct violated public policy:
[T]here is no evidence that, prior to the time when the detective first approached Woo Wai,
any of the defendants had ever been engaged in the unlawful importation of Chinese.. . . The
purpose for which the detective was employed, and the object of the scheme of entrapment, was
not to punish men who were suspected of crime; but the whole purpose was to place Woo Wai
in a position where he might be compelled to disclose facts of which he was suspected to have
knowledge ..
Id. at 414.
10. Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. at 418-19.
11. Id. at 419.
12. Id. at 423 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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dant was violating the law."3 In Brandeis's view, the defendant's state of
mind was irrelevant to the question of whether the prosecution should go
forward. Here, then, lay the foundation for an objective approach to en-
trapment theory.
The Court declined to build on that foundation when the opportunity
arose in Sorrells v. United States' and Sherman v. United States.5 In
both cases, the Court reversed convictions of defendants who had been
pressed by government agents to sell them contraband."0 While the Court
could have relied on the nature of the governmental methods to support its
finding of entrapment, the majority in both cases looked instead to the
defendants' states of mind, holding that the defendants were "innocent"
persons, not predisposed to crime,' 7 who were induced by government offi-
cials to violate the law.' 8 In both cases, however, a minority would have
reached the same result by focusing exclusively on the government's meth-
ods rather than on the character of the defendant. For them, as for Bran-
deis, the repugnancy of government misconduct was sufficient to bar pros-
ecution regardless of the defendant's culpability.' 9 Since these were only
13. Id. at 424-25 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
14. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
15. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
16. In Sorrells, the prosecution's evidence showed that a federal prohibition agent visited the de-
fendant and repeatedly asked him for bootleg liquor. Eventually, after the agent had ingratiated him-
self with the defendant by playing upon friendship and common war experiences, the defendant ac-
quiesced and sold him liquor. Additional evidence produced by the defense showed that the defendant
strenuously resisted the agent's importuning, was of good character, and was not involved in the
liquor business. In rebuttal, government witnesses testified that the defendant had "the general repu-
tation of a rum-runner." The trial judge did not submit the issue of entrapment to the jury. Sorrells,
287 U.S. at 439-41, 452.
In Sherman, a government informer named Kalchinian met Sherman at a doctor's office where both
were being treated for narcotics addiction. After several meetings, Kalchinian, claiming that he was
not responding to treatment, asked Sherman whether he knew where to obtain narcotics or whether
Sherman could supply him with some. Although Sherman resisted these initial entreaties, he eventu-
ally acquiesced and supplied Kalchinian with drugs. In this case, however, the issue of entrapment
was submitted to the jury. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 371-72.
17. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442.
18. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441. The Court in both cases ruled that
Congress did not intend its penal statutes to apply to innocent persons. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372;
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448. Obviously, the characterization of the accused as an innocent person seduced
into crime is not entirely accurate. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 379-80 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) ("[w]ithout compulsion and 'knowingly,' . . . the defendant has violated the statutory command.
If he is to be relieved from the usual punitive consequences, it is on no account because he is innocent
of the offense described."). Likewise, the argument that Congress intended to prohibit prosecution of
innocents is flawed. Id. at 379 (suggestion that Congress did not intend penal statutes to cover tempt-
ing of innocent persons is "sheer fiction"); Sorrels, 287 U.S. at 455-56 (Roberts, J., concurring)
(calling Congressional intent argument "strained and unwarranted"). Indeed, if Congress's intent
were to prevent such prosecutions on the basis of the defendant's intent, it would follow logically that
"innocent" victims beguiled by private entrappers also should be excused. See United States v. Rus-
sell, 411 U.S. 423, 442 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). For a justification of the private person exception to the entrapment defense, see Park,
The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 240-43 (1976).
19. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring, joined by Douglas, Harlan &
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minority views, however, the subjective approach became the test for en-
trapment in the federal courts.
The objective rationale for the entrapment defense, however, was not
entirely lost. In Raley v. Ohio2 ° and Cox v. Louisiana,21 the Court re-
versed, on due process grounds, convictions of defendants who had been
induced to commit criminal acts that had been dishonestly represented by
government agents as lawful."2 In response to these rulings, some lower
federal courts found entrapment where the defendants, though subjected to
excessive governmental inducements, did not fall within the protection of
the subjective entrapment test.23 The Supreme Court checked this trend,
however, in United States v. Russell24 and Hampton v. United States.25
In Russell, a bare majority reinstated the defendant's conviction and in
Hampton, the majority upheld the lower courts' refusal to find entrap-
ment. In so doing, the Court reinforced the subjective nature of the en-
trapment defense and reaffirmed its rationale. In Russell, an undercover
agent infiltrated a drug ring, supplied the defendant with the chemical
ingredients necessary to manufacture the drug, and participated in the
manufacturing process.2" In Hampton, an undercover agent supplied the
defendant with drugs that another government agent involved in the oper-
ation subsequently purchased.2 7 The lower court in Russell found the
government's methods objectionable under entrapment and due process
principles.2" But the Supreme Court declined to put the tactics at issue.
Brennan, JJ.) ("The crucial question" is whether police conduct falls below standards for proper use
of governmental power.); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring, joined by Brandeis &
Stone, JJ.) ("The applicable principle is that courts must be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by
the government's own agents.").
In his concurring opinion in Sherman, Justice Frankfurter articulated another variation of the
entrapment defense-a hybrid approach-that focused on both the government's conduct and the
character of the accused. "This test shifts attention from the record and predisposition of the particu-
lar defendant to the conduct of the police and the likelihood, objectively considered, that it would
entrap only those ready and willing to commit crime." Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384.
20. 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
21. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
22. In Cox, government officials falsely told the defendant that it would be lawful to demonstrate
near a courthouse and then prosecuted him for disorderly conduct when he picketed. In Raley, gov-
ernment officials assured defendants that they had a constitutional privilege to refuse to answer ques-
tions of a state investigating commission and then prosecuted them for contempt for their refusal to
answer.
23. See United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975) (reversing conviction on due process
grounds); United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971) (same); United States v. McGrath,
468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 412 U.S. 936 (1973), on remand, 494 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
24. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
25. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
26. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 425-27.
27. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 486-87 (recounting defendant's version of the
transaction).
28. United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding "an intolerable degree of
governmental participation in the criminal enterprise"), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
1570
Vol. 91: 1565, 1982
Abscam and Entrapment
The defense of entrapment, wrote Justice Rehnquist in Russell, "was not
intended to give the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law
enforcement practices of which it did not approve."2 Indeed, "if the po-
lice engage in illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the scope
of their duties," the Hampton court held, "the remedy lies, not in freeing
the equally culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police . . .-.
These rulings illuminate the divergence between the subjective and the
objective theories of entrapment. Adherents of the subjective approach in-
sist on tying the availability of the defense to the culpability of the defen-
dant. The investigative techniques used by the government are relevant to
the inquiry only insofar as they negate a showing of predisposition. The
subjective approach thus permits judicial scrutiny of government conduct
only in rare cases.3" Proponents of the objective test, on the other hand,
advocate scrutiny of investigative methods to determine whether the prose-
cution may invoke judicial process to obtain a conviction.
II. Testing the Integrity of Government Officials: The Abscam Investi-
gation and Prosecutions
The differences between the subjective and objective approaches to en-
trapment assume a more concrete form when viewed in the context of the
specific Abscam cases. This section describes the Abscam investigation and
compares the results that different courts, looking at similar sets of facts,
have reached. The opinions are startling not only in their differences, but
also in the way that they highlight the gap in protection resulting from
the subjective approach.
A. The Investigation
Abscam was the code name for a Federal Bureau of Investigations
(FBI) undercover operation "designed to test the faith of those in high
echelons of Government" by contriving opportunities for corruption. 2
29. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 435.
30. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 490.
31. Although the five-judge majority in Russell indicated that outrageous law enforcement conduct
would bar the government under due process principles from invoking judicial process to obtain a
conviction, 411 U.S. at 431-32, three members of the Hampton plurality (Burger, C.J., White &
Rehnquist, JJ.) would limit the availability of due process protection to situations in which the defen-
dant is not predisposed and government officials have violated the defendant's independent constitu-
tional rights, 425 U.S. at 488-90. The other members of the plurality, however, (Blackmun & Powell,
JJ.) consider due process protection available even when the defendant has been shown to be predis-
posed. Thus, under Hampton one could conclude that a majority of the Court viewed due process as a
permissible way to control certain investigative abuses. This conclusion may not hold today, however,
since Justice Stevens did not participate in the Hampton decision and Justice O'Connor has replaced
Justice Stewart, who dissented in Hampton.
32. United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 43 (2d Cir. 1982).
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FBI agents, assisted by Melvin Weinberg, a reputed con man who had
recently been convicted of mail fraud, posed as representatives of two
wealthy Arab sheiks. The sheiks purportedly wanted to emigrate to the
United States and invest in American real estate and businesses. The ob-
jective of the operation was to attract public officials who would agree to
facilitate the sheiks' objectives and accept generous bribe payments in ex-
change for their assistance. The sheiks' representations initially attracted
the attention of Angelo Errichetti, a New Jersey politician who claimed to
have extensive underworld contacts, and Howard Criden, a Philadelphia
attorney seeking financing for an Atlantic City gambling casino. Upon
learning of the sheiks' interests, the two "formed an alliance" to produce
public officials who would be willing to influence other government au-
thorities on the sheiks' behalf.33
The alliance proved very effective. Congressmen Michael Myers and
Raymond Lederer of Pennsylvania each readily accepted payments of
$50,000."' Congressman John Murphy of New York accepted a briefcase
containing $50,000 and negotiated financing for a private business venture
in exchange for a promise to assist the sheik in immigration matters. 35 His
colleague, Congressman Frank Thompson of New Jersey, refused a
$50,000 payment at an initial meeting with the sheik; but at a second
meeting, Thompson accepted from the agents a briefcase containing the
payment. 36
FBI agents found that soliciting corrupt conduct from Senator Harrison
Williams of New Jersey and Congressman Richard Kelly of Florida was
more challenging. The sheiks met with Senator Williams on at least seven
33. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aft'd, 692 F.2d 823 (2d
Cir. 1982).
34. Myers, Errichetti, Criden, and Louis C. Johanson, Criden's law partner, shared the $50,000
which Myers received. At trial, Myers testified that he had no criminal intent and was only "play
acting." He did not raise the entrapment defense. He was convicted of receiving bribes, 18 U.S.C. §
201(c) (1976), using means of interstate travel for unlawful' activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976), and
conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). Errichetti, Criden, and Johanson were convicted of conspiracy
and of aiding and abetting Myers on the bribery and interstate travel counts. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
Lederer received only $5,000 of his payment; Criden, Errichetti, and Johanson divided the remainder
among themselves. Although Lederer raised the entrapment defense, it was rejected by the jury. Like
Myers, Lederer was convicted on bribery, conspiracy and interstate travel counts. United States v.
Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1212-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aft'd, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982).
35. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1212-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), afl'd, 692 F.2d 823
(2d Cir. 1982). At the joint trial of Thompson and Murphy, Thompson was convicted of bribery, 18
U.S.C. § 201(c) (1976), conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976), and receiving a criminal gratuity, 18
U.S.C. § 201(g) (1976), and was found not guilty of conflict of interest, 18 U.S.C. § 203 (a) (1976).
Murphy was found not guilty of bribery, "apparently because [the jury members] were not satisfied
that he had fully committed himself to use his influence on the sheik's behalf." United States v.
Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1214 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aftd, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982). He was,
however, found guilty of conflict of interest, conspiracy, and receiving a criminal gratuity. Id. Neither
defendant raised the entrapment defense at trial.
36. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1237 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), afl'd, 692 F.2d 823 (2d
Cir. 1982).
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occasions over a year. They offered financial assistance for a personal bus-
iness venture in exchange for the Senator's promise to help obtain govern-
ment contracts for the venture. Williams repeatedly emphasized that he
would not exploit his government service to the advantage of private
financial transactions, and he rebuffed plans to conceal profits from the
venture from the Internal Revenue Service.3" At a final meeting, however,
Williams consented to the agents' proposal.38
Congressman Richard Kelly's reluctance to accept a bribe also frus-
trated the FBI. Although Weinberg had been told by an acquaintance that
Kelly was likely to assist the sheik in exchange for a bribe, Kelly rejected
the agents' initial offer.39 At a second meeting, after the agents had been
warned that Kelly "ain't taking no money ... in his hand,"40 Kelly
again stated that he would have "no part in" money arrangements con-
cerning immigration matters."1 The agents persisted, however, and finally
persuaded Kelly to accept $25,000.42
The FBI also used Abscam to investigate local corruption in Philadel-
37. United States v. Williams, 529 F. Supp. 1085, 1091 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal docketed, No.
82-1111 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 1982). As part of the investigation, Weinberg coached Williams on the
appropriate conduct for meeting with the sheik:
In effect, the Senator was told that, whereas both he and the representatives knew that the
proposed venture was entirely legitimate, that it would not involve government contracts, and
that the Senator had not agreed to and would not be expected to use his official position to
advance the interests of the enterprise, it would be helpful if the Senator were to impress the
sheik with the importance of his position in the Senate, and his knowledge of the other impor-
tant persons in the Government.
United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 906 (1982). At a meeting to discuss the proposed business deal with
the sheik, Williams in fact emphasized his long career in the Senate and his connections in Washing-
ton. Id. at 1195. Weinberg's coaching, however, was not a novel technique. At an August 1979 meet-
ing between Weinberg and attorneys from the Office of the United States Attorney for the District of
New Jersey, Weinberg stated "that if he did not put words into the subjects' mouths the government
would never be able to make cases." United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1235 (E.D.N.Y.
1981), alTd, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982).
38. Although Williams raised an entrapment defense at trial, the jury convicted him of bribery, 18
U.S.C. § 201(c) (1976), receiving a criminal gratuity, 18 U.S.C. § 201(g) (1976), conflict of interest,
18 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1976), interstate travel for unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976), and
conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). In essence, the jury found that Williams either received or agreed
to receive stock in a titanium mining venture and financing from the sheik in return for his commit-
ment to help obtain government contracts for the titanium mine. United States v. Williams, 529 F.
Supp. 1085, 1091-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1111 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 1982).
39. United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363, 367 (D.D.C. 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82-1660
(D.C. Cir. June 15, 1982).
40. Id. at 368. In a post-conviction opinion, the court quoted at length from a transcript of a
recorded conversation between Weinberg and Eugene Ciuzio, a mutual acquaintance of Weinberg and
Kelly. Ciuzio ambiguously stated: "He's a kid and I know he's ripe for the first big. . . score. This is
a Congressman, ya understand? This ain't. . . a hustler. .... Don't hand him no . . .money." Id.
41. Id. at 370.
42. Id. Kelly was convicted by a jury of bribery, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1976), conspiracy, 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (1976), and interstate travel to commit crime, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976). Co-defendant Ciuzio
was found guilty of aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), conspiracy, and interstate travel to
commit crime.
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phia. To execute this stage of the operation, Weinberg informed Criden
that the sheik wanted to build an elaborate hotel complex in the city if, in
accordance with the stereotype of "the Arab mind" propagated throughout
the investigation, he "could be assured of the friendship of important gov-
ernment officials." 4 Criden dutifully arranged meetings between the
sheik's "representatives" and George Schwartz and Harry Jannotti, presi-
dent and majority leader, respectively, of the City Council. At separate
meetings with Schwartz and Jannotti, an undercover agent posing as a
representative of the sheik repeatedly asked the men for assurances that
the hotel project would encounter no "problems." 44 Both Schwartz and
Jannotti repeatedly responded that if the project were legitimate and ben-
eficial for the city, they would support it."' At the conclusion of the meet-
43. See United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1184, 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673
F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 906 (1982). The judge in Jannotti considered
the ethnic stereotyping of the Arab mentality and "the Arab way of doing business" as "[plerhaps the
crucial aspect of the undercover operation" and highly questionable. The agents frequently repre-
sented that their principals would not even undertake a legitimate project "unless first assured of the
'friendship' of the persons with whom they were dealing." The sheiks purportedly were impressed
with titles, with persons in power and influence; "[t]heir concept of 'making friends' was that money
had to be paid." Insofar as the Philadelphia aspect of Abscam was concerned, "there was no sugges-
tion that the putative sheik required or expected any violation of the law in exchange for the payment;
he merely wished to be assured that he had 'friends' in high places." Id. at 1194.
44. For example, one conversation went as follows:
WALD: Can I go back, ah ah, to my employer, the Sheik and tell him that I dealt with a
man, on Wednesday night tell him who he is, dealt with you, Thursday night, explain who
you were, what your position is and say he and I conducted a cash business transaction and he
guaranteed me, we don't have a problem in Philadelphia. We ah, ah City councils on our side
the man has the influence with the Finance Committee, he has influence ....
JANNOTTI: You wouldn't, you wouldn't be able to say we don't have a problem.
Problems might arise, but problems ah, you might say problems can be solved.
WALD: OK, you can handle those problems we presume.
JANNOTTI: I don't see why not if it's a legitimate, if it's a if it's a legitimate if it's a, if it's
a legitimate enterprise, it's a legitimate piece of business.
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 589 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 906 (1982).
45. At a meeting with the agents, Schwartz stated that no problem would be "'insurmountable'"
as long as the project "'is a proper project.'" When Criden interjected "'It's going to be legitimate,'"
Schwartz responded, "'That I take for granted, or I wouldn't be here.'" The following then occurred:
WALD: Our time frame is growing short, but we don't have those type of problems. We
don't have that built-in resentment. Ah. . . . We've talked to Howard, you know, the figures,
the dollars we're talking are in the right ballpark. We're ....
SCHWARTZ: That's not my prime concern. I'm interested in the City of Philadelphia. I'm
interested in a good project. I'm interested in tax rateables. I want to see Center City develop.
Especially Center City. There are a few parcels left. Well anything else that's going to add to
the tax rateables of the city that's going to create jobs.
Id. at 585-86. The transcript of the conversation at a meeting between the agents and Jannotti in-
cluded a similar exchange:
WALD: It's a legitimate operation.
JANNOTTI: As long as it's, long as it's a legitimate, legitimate operation. Ya know, any
legitimate operation we will fight for because, ah, ya know why shouldn't we fight for a legiti-
mate operation? If the operation is legitimate, it's going to bring a tax base into the City of
Philadelphia, it's going to bring employment into the City of Philadelphia, ah, this is, this is
basically our job . . . to try to get as much money into the City of Philadelphia and as many




ings, Schwartz and Jannotti received $30,000 and $10,000, respectively."'
B. The Abscam Case Law: Four Views of Entrapment and Law
Enforcement
As a result of the Abscam investigation, twenty-five individuals, includ-
ing one United States Senator, six United States Representatives, and
other public officials and lawyers, were indicted for corrupt acts by federal
grand juries in New York, Philadelphia and the District of Columbia.
Thoughtful judges have characterized the legal issues raised by these cases
in strikingly different ways. Although few of the defendants raised the
subjective defense of entrapment at trial, all alleged constitutional due
process violations based on an objective theory of entrapment. Many of
the judges were reluctant to condemn the choices of the Executive in its
sphere of competence and rejected the Abscam defendants' claims. Others
excoriated the government for the tactics it used. This clash of opinions
illuminates the unsettling consequences of a doctrine which is incapable of
restraining overreaching investigative abuses.
1. United States v. Myers47
In post-trial motions to set aside their convictions, defendants Myers,
Lederer, Thompson, Murphy, Errichetti, and Criden urged Judge George
Pratt, of the Eastern District of New York, to use an objective entrapment
standard to evaluate the government's conduct. Alternatively, they urged
the judge to apply a due process standard, claiming that the outrageous-
ness of the operation "bar[red] the government," as a matter of due pro-
46. United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 906 (1982). Although Schwartz did not testify at trial, a
witness who served as an intermediary between Criden and Schwartz testified that he told Schwartz
that, according to Criden, "[t]here would be a fee for Mr. Schwartz for his advice." Id. at 1198.
Criden testified at a post-trial hearing that he told Schwartz "that he would receive a consulting fee."
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 584 n.6 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 906
(1982). When Jannotti received the envelope containing the payment, the agents asked him whether
"[the] amount [was] sufficient." Jannotti repeatedly responded that "[wie won't even discuss it." Id. at
589.
The jury found both Jannotti and Schwartz guilty of conspiring to obstruct interstate commerce in
violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1976), and Schwartz guilty of conspiracy in viola-
tion of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)
(1976). Id. at 580. With respect to the Hobbs Act conviction, the government had argued that the
defendants had conspired to affect interstate commerce by their acceptance of payments in return for
their promises to expedite completion of the hotel project. Id. at 594. With respect to the RICO
conviction, the government argued that Schwartz conspired with Criden and others to conduct the
affairs of Criden's law firm through the payment of bribes to public officials, a pattern of racketeering
activity. United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1187 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 906 (1982).
47. 527 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), atfd, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982).
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cess, "from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction." 4
Judge Pratt declined both offers. He held that the government needed
no factual basis establishing at least a suspicion of criminal activity to
undertake an investigation of Abscam's magnitude. 49 He also declined to
focus on the specific methods used to solicit the Congressmen since the
defendants "could simply have said 'no' to the offer"50 and avoided crimi-
nal liability.51 In particular, he rejected the contention that the induce-
ments offered by the government were overwhelming, since "[n]o matter
how much money is offered to a government official as a bribe or gratuity,
he should be punished if he accepts."52 Underlying Pratt's support of the
government's actions was the great public interest he perceived to be at
stake. Official corruption, he noted, posed a danger greater than any for-
eign enemy:
[T]he government needs to have available the weapons of undercover
operations, infiltration of bribery schemes, and "sting" operations
such as Abscam in order to expose those officials who are corrupt, to
deter others who might be tempted to be corrupt, and perhaps most
importantly, to praise by negative example those who are honest and
square-dealing.5"
48. Id. at 1225.
49. Judge Pratt, following the Second Circuit decision in United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932
(2d Cir.) (refusing to quash indictments of Abscam defendant), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980),
wrote that "the Constitution does not require reasonable suspicion before a congressman may be made
the subject of an undercover sting." 527 F. Supp. at 1226.
50. 527 F. Supp. at 1225.
51. To support this proposition, the court noted that Congressman Edward Patton of New Jersey
and Senator Larry Pressler of South Dakota declined bribe offers in front of the FBI cameras. Id.
52. Id. at 1228. The defendants contended that the size of the cash payments-S50,000 to
$100,000-was overwhelming in that it was designed to induce "honest and innocent people to com-
mit a crime they would normally avoid." Id. at 1227.
53. Id. at 1229. A similar analysis was employed in United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1982). There, in an Abscam opinion affirming a bribery conviction of an immigration official, the
Court held that the "line between lawful subterfuge and excessive Government involvement is drawn
when the end sought cannot be justified by the means used." Id. at 35. Contrasting Alexandro with
cases in which violations of due process were found based on the government's use of coercion to
obtain evidence, the Court concluded that Alexandro had not been coerced, forced into crime, or
drawn inexorably into an elaborate ongoing criminal enterprise. Thus, although it conceded that Ab-
scam "indeed was an intricate artifice, a stratagem of convoluted ploys and schemes," it emphatically
concluded that "the special relationship between the public and those who serve the Government"
demands that "the public will call for, and law enforcement officials will rely upon, special investiga-
tive techniques to uncover insidious corruption." Id. at 43.
Members of the office of the United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey disputed the
validity of this means-ends analysis. They openly criticized the investigation and argued that the
government's methods may have violated the defendants' rights. Judge Pratt cautioned that the New
Jersey prosecutors "were jealous of the obvious importance and success of the investigation" and
"embarrassed" by an investigation that revealed a "cesspool of corruption" in their own jurisdiction.




The Second Circuit upheld the convictions of the Myers defendants and
affirmed the rulings of the district court."
2. United States v. Williams55
At trial, Senator Williams raised the subjective defense of entrapment,
arguing that he was not predisposed to accept the government agents'
bribes. Perhaps his strongest evidence on this point was an internal FBI
memorandum suggesting that the government's case against Williams was
incomplete and that further proof of Williams' criminal predisposition
was needed to seek an indictment. The jury, however, was unconvinced
and found Williams guilty of the crimes charged. Judge Pratt denied Wil-
liams's post-trial motion to set aside the conviction, concluding that the
evidence, while not "overwhelming," was sufficient to support the jury's
decision."6 "Merely because some government employees were not overly
impressed with the strength of the Williams case as of November 27,
1979," the court held, did not preclude the government "from testing the
sufficiency of its evidence before the grand jury in obtaining an indict-
ment, or from convincing a petit jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt."557
3. United States v. Kelly 8
In contrast to Judge Pratt's benign attitude toward the propriety of the
Abscam techniques stands the decision of Judge William Bryant, of the
District of Columbia, to set aside the jury conviction of Congressman
Kelly. While Judge Bryant recognized the need for covert investigations in
order to discover crime, he was unwilling to allow the government to pur-
sue that goal without restraints. According to Bryant, the government had
unleashed Abscam on Kelly without the "remotest suspicion" of prior,
ongoing, or imminent criminal activity on his part. 9 Giving the govern-
54. United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d at 823. In addition to passing on the issues decided by
Judge Pratt, the Second Circuit considered the claim that the allegedly corrupt responses had been so
ambiguously solicited that the convictions violated requirements of due process. One defendant argued
that the government must make offers of bribes clear when it manages a sting so that the defendant
has "the opportunity to say 'No.'" Id. at 843. The court, however, was "unmoved" by the question of
whether the investigators' bribes were unfairly obscured since "the agents did not violate due process
limits by observing the defendants' ground rules." Id. at 845.
55. 529 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-1111 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 1982).
56. Id. at 1096. While there was no clear-cut evidence showing that Williams had previously
engaged in corrupt activity, the court pointed to proof showing that Williams had earlier sought to use
his influence to obtain a permit for casinos; "that Williams was willing to receive cash in 'expense
money' as long as it did not pass to him directly"; and that Williams sought to conceal his involvement
in the titanium mine by use of a "blind trust." Id.
57. Id. at 1100.
58. 539 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82-1660 (D.C. Cir. June 15, 1982).
59. Id. at 371.
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ment the power to act in such circumstances would create a "great poten-
tial" for mischief; Bryant considered the absence of a factual basis reason
alone "for outlawing the government's conduct."8 But Bryant's dismay
did not stop there. Bryant stated that "the testing should have ended"
after Kelley said "'I got no part in that' " and rejected the bribe. 1 Bryant
explained that "further pursuit and pressure on the part of government
agents was nothing short of outrageous. A suspicion-free subject should be
exempted from further testing on the basis of winning the first battle
against temptation. He should not be required to win a prolonged war of
attrition against chicanery." ' 2
4. United States v. Jannotti6 3
Judge John Fullam, of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, expressed
concerns similar to those voiced by Judge Bryant in setting aside the jury
convictions of Philadelphia officials Jannotti and Schwartz. He began his
analysis within the standard subjective entrapment model. According to
the government's evidence, the agents originated the idea of bribe pay-
ments and insisted that the hotel project would be abandoned unless Jan-
notti and Schwartz accepted the sheik's gesture. Given this evidence,
Judge Fullam held that there was no factual basis for showing that Phila-
delphia officials Jannotti and Schwartz were predisposed to commit the
crime. The judge therefore ruled that the defendants had been entrapped
as a matter of law and were entitled to a verdict of "not guilty." ''
Judge Fullam then went beyond the subjective approach to assess the
government's investigative techniques and its purposes. Setting up a ficti-
tious business entity, hinting that corrupt overtures would be welcome,
and even initiating bribe proposals in connection with suspected ongoing
corrupt activities 8-all of these were permissible. But, he held, "it is
surely not within the legitimate province of federal agents to embark upon
a program of corrupting municipal officials, merely to demonstrate that it
60. Id. at 378 n.58.
61. Id. at 374.
62. Id. at 376. The court reasoned that since a legislator would most likely be left alone in real
life after rejecting a bribe, an undercover investigation that does not simulate that probability does not
catch criminals, but creates them. It was therefore necessary to set aside convictions arising from those
circumstances: "Governmental manufacture of crime in this sense is as odious, and as prejudicial to a
target's rights, as is the governmental snaring of the 'unwary innocent.'" Id. at 377. But see United
States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 844 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Undercover agents offering bribes to Congress-
men are entitled to simulate the guarded conversation that would be expected of those proposing an
unlawful venture. They need not say, 'Congressman, I have here a cash bribe to be exchanged for
your corrupt promise to be influenced in your official action.' ") (citations omitted).
63. 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 906 (1982).
64. Id. at 1200, 1205.
65. Id. at 1204.
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is possible."68 Judge Fullam found that the defendants were offered "ex-
ceedingly generous" inducements, were not requested to engage in corrupt
activity in exchange, and were further compelled by appeals to civic duty.
Thus, by enticing defendants with inducements "calculated to overwhelm"
them, the agents acted in bad faith, seeking not to detect crime but to
promote it.67 This conduct violated the defendants' due process rights and
required that the jury convictions be set aside.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed
Judge Fullam's ruling and reinstated the jury verdicts.68 The court held
that there could not be entrapment as a matter of law and that the jury
properly could have found that acceptance of the money by the defen-
dants, even if they did not originate the scheme, showed predisposition.
The majority also struck down the lower court's due process rulings and
cautioned against a supervisory role for the judiciary in controlling inves-
tigative abuses. It warned that "the conduct of agents of the executive
branch who must protect the public from crime is more appropriately con-
sidered through the political process where divergent views can be ex-
pressed in the ballot box."'69
Two judges strongly disagreed. In a lengthy dissent, they argued that
the judiciary must not "shirk responsibility" in regulating impermissible
government conduct. They characterized the prosecutions of Jannotti and
Schwartz as "classic model[s] of the type of entrapment that our society
emphatically condemns '70 and compared the federal agents' techniques to
those used by the Gestapo and other secret police organizations.7 1 Clearly
convinced that the government had induced Jannotti and Schwartz to ac-
cept the bribes,"' they argued that the government had failed to make the
necessary showing to rebut the defendants' assertion of entrapment and to
prove predisposition.7 3
66. Id. at 1205. "[I]n the present case," Judge Fullam noted, "it was the Government, and the
Government alone, which created the pattern [of corruption], as well as each bribe." Id. at 1204. In
reaching its conclusion, the court relied on United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d. 670 (2d Cir. 1973)
(dismissing indictment on ground that federal government contrived to manufacture federal jurisdic-
tional base).
67. United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1200 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 906 (1982).
68. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 906
(1982).
69. Id. at 609.
70. Id. at 618 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 613 ("The Gestapo were the consummate users of the 'honey pot.' ").
72. Id. at 617 (characterizing FBI as "consummate manufacturers of crime. They built the plant,
they designed the machinery, they operated it, and they covertly solicited the defendants to be custom-
ers of their product").
73. Id. at 619-20.
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III. The Limitations of Entrapment Doctrine
The judicial decisions sustaining Abscam illustrate what shall be made
more apparent in this section: where it is recognized, the entrapment de-
fense is predicated on logic that is fundamentally incoherent. This inco-
herence arises at the core of the defense-predisposition-and is one fac-
tor creating the diversity of views in the Abscam opinions. What the
Abscam cases also show, unfortunately, is that the courts are unwilling to
intervene in the face of such problems and impose a stringent objective
test. Instead, the police are free to utilize unlimited government resources
and irresistible temptations to seduce unsuspecting persons who might not
otherwise commit crimes.
A. The Predisposition Dilemma
Jurisdictions that apply the subjective test of entrapment require the
government to prove that the defendant was predisposed to commit the
offense and did not act solely on the basis of government inducements.74
Because a thorough inquiry into the defendant's actual predisposition
would be extremely difficult, a showing of prior criminal inclination 5
often is deemed sufficient to meet the government's evidentiary burden. At
first glance this rule seems inconsistent; the criminal law nowhere else
74. Under the majority subjective rule, entrapment is a question of fact for the jury. See W.
LAFAVE & A. SCoTr, supra note 5, § 48, at 373. In the federal courts, once the defendant has raised
the issue of entrapment, the government must disprove entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt. See,
e.g., United States v. Pico-Zazueta, 564 F.2d 1367, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Silver,
457 F.2d 1217, 1220 (3d Cir. 1972). It is far from clear, however, whether the government is consti-
tutionally required to bear this heavy a burden. See infra note 108 and sources cited therein.
An even less well-settled issue is the question of how much proof the defendant must offer to meet
the initial burden of raising the defense. One approach places evidentiary obligations on both the
defendant and the government. Under this approach, as described by Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1952), the courts must ask (1) whether the agent induced
the accused to commit the offense charged in the indictment, and if so, (2) whether the accused was
ready and willing to act without persuasion and whether he was awaiting any propitious opportunity
to commit the offense. The accused has the burden on the first question; the prosecution has the
burden on the second. According to Judge Hand, inducement includes "soliciting, proposing, initiat-
ing, broaching or suggesting the commission of the offense charged." It need not include, however,
"trickery" or "fraud." Id. at 883. Under this definition, proof by the defendant of government initia-
tion, standing alone, would satisfy the defendant's evidentiary obligation. See, e.g., United States v.
Riley, 363 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1966) (inducement "goes simply to the Government's initiation of
the crime and not to the degree of pressure exerted"). This broad definition of inducement has been
followed in some circuits but has met strong oppositon in others that have defined inducement much
more restrictively. In the latter circuits, initiation or solicitation by a government official, without
more, is insufficient to constitute inducement for purposes of raising the entrapment defense. See
United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 (1979);
United States v. Christopher, 488 F.2d 849, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1973); Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d
163, 165-69 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969); Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 373-
74 (1st Cir. 1967).
75. Such a showing might include proof of the defendant's bad reputation, past criminal conduct,




entitles a prosecutor to demonstrate culpability for an act on the basis of
the defendant's previous criminal acts.78 But it at least comports with
common sense that prior criminal inclination will imply the existence of
some present criminal predisposition. 7 The government did not face even
this great an evidentiary burden in the Abscam cases, however, since the
jury was allowed to infer predisposition simply from the defendant's af-
firmative response to the government's inducements. For instance, that de-
fendants Myers and Lederer readily accepted cash payments was found to
constitute sufficient evidence that they had a preexisting intention to take
a bribe. In other words, the defendant is said to be predisposed because he
committed the act, and then is held responsible for the act because he was
predisposed. The pernicious circularity of this approach is obvious. By
allowing the evidentiary gap to be so easily bridged, the doctrine in no
way restrains the government in its choice of tactics; in fact, it may actu-
ally encourage the government to offer unreasonably exorbitant tempta-
tions not only to obtain evidence of the crime but also to overcome the
evidentiary hurdle of showing predisposition.
The difficulty with this evidentiary bootstrapping has not been over-
looked by more astute members of the judiciary. Judge Learned Hand, for
example, was painfully aware of the problem. In United States v. Beck-
er,7 8 an opinion cited by Judge Pratt as authority for his assertion that
acceptance of the bribe was sufficient to show predisposition7 9 Judge
Hand counted the defendant's "willingness to [commit the crime], as
evinced by ready complaisance,"'80 as among the conditions that excuse
government entrapment. He carefully qualified this assertion, however,
explaining that he did "not wish to commit [the court] to the doctrine that
mere readiness is enough" to demonstrate predisposition. The whole en-
trapment doctrine, he continued, "derives from a spontaneous moral re-
vulsion against using the powers of government to beguile innocent,
though ductile, persons into lapses which they might otherwise resist.
Such an emotion is out of place, if they are already embarked on conduct
morally indistinguishable and of the same kind."81 Judge Hand elabo-
76. FED. R. EVID. 404(b); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 190 (2d ed.
1972); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 55, 57 (3d ed. 1940).
77. This proposition, nevertheless, has serious adverse practical consequences, since it may en-
courage the government to entrap persons on the basis of status. See United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 443-44 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that past offenders may disproportionately
be targeted for solicitation on the theory that they would be unable effectively to raise the entrapment
defense).
78. 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933).
79. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), afi'd, 692 F.2d 823 (2d
Cir. 1982).
80. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d Cir. 1933).
81. Id. at 1009 (emphasis added).
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rated this view in a later case, the Second Circuit opinion in United States
v. Sherman.82 Predisposition was present, Judge Hand stated, only where
the accused was seeking explicitly "to realize his preexisting purpose" and
was "awaiting any propitious opportunity to commit the offense."183
Using Judge Hand's standard, the juries in the trials of Errichetti and
Criden could have properly inferred from the evidence that the defendants
previously had engaged in corrupt conduct or that they would have seized
any propitious opportunity for corrupt enrichment. Whether the same
judgment may be made about defendants Schwartz, Jannotti, and Wil-
liams is less certain. Their predisposition, however, was certainly not es-
tablished simply by showing that they responded to the government's
overtures.
Another difficulty with the concept of predisposition is that it encour-
ages, indeed almost requires, judges and juries to adopt what might be
considered a crypto-Calvinistic view of human nature. To apply the doc-
trine with any consistency, courts must frequently divide society into two
classes. The first contains the honest, law-abiding, unwary innocents. The
second contains the dishonest and corrupt criminals. It is permissible for
police to entrap members of the latter class, but not those of the former.
Human nature, however, is not so neatly categorized, particularly when
the criminal charge involves allegations of political corruption. Official
corruption, in contrast to personal, property, or contraband crimes, is
characterized by subtle, complex, and frequently ambiguous behavior.84
Factors like background, character, emotional disposition, environment,
and circumstances-all combine to produce behavior that usually fails to
indicate from a moral, psychological, or sociological perspective whether
an individual falls at one end or the other of the predisposition spec-
trum.8 5 For example, suppose that a law-abiding but financially strapped
public official suddenly finds himself faced with huge medical bills occa-
sioned by family illness. Aware of his predicament, the government lures
him into a corrupt act in return for a very considerable cash payment.
The temptation is great, and because of his circumstances, he willingly
succumbs. Can we say confidently that such person is a predisposed and
unwary criminal? Is it fair to say in this case, as Judge Pratt wrote in
82. 200 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1952).
83. Id. at 882.
84. This is not to say that bribery invariably is ambiguous, but simply that when dealing with
quids, quos, and their relationship, there is much room for disagreement as to whether a criminal act
occurred. See, e.g., People v. Cunningham, 88 Misc. 2d 1065, 390 N.Y.S.2d 547 (Sup. Ct. 1976)
(dismissing bribery indictment because of uncertainty as to whether transaction was bribe or simply
traditional, albeit unethical, political deal).
85. See United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (distinction between
predisposed and nonpredisposed mental state "not necessarily clearcut"), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 906 (1982).
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Myers, that the defendant "could simply have said 'no' ,,?"8 Or, putting
the question another way, should the government have the power to tempt
previously law-abiding persons, thereby creating a "predisposition" that
previously did not exist? Obviously, the current standard fails to take into
account the degree and ambiguity of the provocation, the complexity and
ambiguity of the response, and the effect of repeated assaults on human
resistance to temptation.8 7
B. The Problem of Inconsistent Defenses in Political Corruption Cases
Additionally, the predisposition problem may be aggravated in prosecu-
tions for political corruption by the procedural rule that sometimes pre-
cludes defendants from raising inconsistent defenses.88 In the Abscam
prosecutions, for example, the rule would have required defendants seek-
ing to claim entrapment first to admit the crime of bribery. Where a
transaction is unambiguous, as in drug cases, the rule precluding inconsis-
tent defenses is not problematic. In such cases, claims of entrapment and
lack of involvement would be difficult to reconcile. In a corruption case,
on the other hand, the transaction that is the gravamen of the crime often
is ambiguous; while money may have been exchanged, its characterization
as a bribe, a consulting fee, or a campaign contribution may be the critical
issue. To require from a defendant who wishes to claim entrapment an
admission that the payment was a bribe forces him to make a Hobson's
choice."9 Again, the benefit of ambiguity redounds only to the prosecution.
C. Misunderstanding the Significance of Inducements
Quite apart from the question of predisposition is the problem of the
inducement or instigation. Abscam probably stretched the concept of in-
ducement in entrapment law to its limit. Huge amounts of money were
86. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), alfd, 692 F.2d 823 (2d
Cir. 1982).
87. Cf United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, J., concurring)
(arguing that "[tjhe criminal law should be opened up to new behavioral information to better ap-
proximate . . . the ideal that the law punishes only the free choice to do wrong").
88. While the District of Columbia, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits permit a defendant to raise in-
consistent defenses, the remainder generally do not. See United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158,
1169-72 (2d Cir. 1980). Some Abscan defendants fell under each rule.
Under Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the District of Columbia
allows federal criminal defendants both to deny participation in the alleged criminal activity and claim
entrapment. The Second Circuit permits the defendant to claim both noninvolvement and entrapment
where he introduces no evidence inconsistent with the entrapment defense. See United States v. Valen-
cia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1172 (2d Cir. 1980). The Third Circuit precludes a claim of entrapment where
the defendant has already claimed non-involvement in the crime. See United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d
512, 514 (3d Cir. 1981).
89. See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 614 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), crt.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 906 (1982).
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dangled as bait. Actual cash payments ranged from $10,000 to $100,000;
$170 million was offered to finance the Williams' mining venture; $150
million was offered to finance the Philadelphia hotel project; $10 million
was offered to Williams as his anticipated profit.
Ordinarily, one would expect that the inducements offered by the gov-
ernment should parallel the inducements to which the target presumably
has been exposed in his criminal activities, or with which he might rea-
sonably be confronted. Otherwise, as Judge Bryant observed in United
States v. Kelly, a law enforcement investigation creates criminals instead
of catching them. 0 More typical of the judicial response, however, was
Judge Pratt, who stated "[n]o matter how much money is offered to a
governmental official ...he should be punished if he accepts." 91 The
issue, however, is not that simple. Persistent offers, exorbitant amounts of
money, and appeals to emotion or civic duty may seduce a person of ordi-
nary firmness into a compromising position. It is highly debatable
whether the inducements in Abscam were of the degree that would permit
a fair and informed judgment that the defendant had a preexisting pur-
pose to commit a crime and simply chose this opportunity to realize his
ambition.
The excessive inducements used in Abscam become even more objec-
tionable when viewed in light of the means by which the government
chose the targets at which Abscam was aimed. Prior to the investigation
the government lacked any factual basis to suspect any public official of
engaging in criminal activity. The presence of some factual justifica-
tion-perhaps not even reaching the level of probable cause or reasonable
suspicion-would have suggested that the government was using its scarce
resources properly, not arbitrarily, and was offering inducements only to
those persons who either had shown a willingness to engage in crime or
were curiently engaged in crime or about to commit a crime. 92 The ab-
sence of any factual basis naturally raises questions about the bona fides
of such law enforcement tactics.
The government's ability gratuitously to generate crime through ran-
dom honesty checks clearly involves unjustified intrusion into citizens' pri-
vacy and autonomy.9" Such interference, however, is ordinarily restricted
90. United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363, 376 (D.D.C. 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82-1660
(D.C. Cir. June 15, 1982).
91. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1228 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aft'd, 692 F.2d 823 (2d
Cir. 1982).
92. See Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked Consciences and the Staged Arrest, 66 MINN. L. REV.
567, 612-14 (1982).
93. It may well be that integrity tests for government officials are necessary to deter misconduct.
Whether "[t]he awful instruments of the criminal law," McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343
(1943), should be employed, however, is a wholly separate question. This is not to advocate double
standards. Persons who initially are suspected of criminal wrongdoing and who then are investigated
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by procedural safeguards such as the requirement of a warrant.9 Ironi-
cally, however, the Abscam operation, an intrusion of greater duration
and intensity, was not subject to such safeguards. Government agents
secretly monitored the Abscam defendants for many months, recorded
their intimate conversations and surreptitiously videotaped meetings they
attended. No judge authorized such procedures; indeed it is unlikely that
any judge would have authorized this type of surveillance absent prior
suspicion.
It is critically important to note that such integrity testing could easily
become a tool of political oppression, as the dissenters in United States v.
Jannotti observed.15 Consider how an operation like Abscam, with power-
ful resources at its disposal, could effectively silence enemies, opponents,
and political dissidents. There is no question that innocent persons may be
solicited; several were in Abscam. 6 Those who are strong enough to resist
sometimes overwhelming temptation are fortunate. Others, however, may
yield, producing a class of unwitting government-fashioned criminals.
Such undercover infiltration and provocation may also produce a police
state mentality, evoking fear, paranoia, and mutual distrust among friends
and colleagues. Historically such tactics have been favored by totalitarian
regimes 9 -their use in Abscam has frightening and far-reaching implica-
tions that most courts have overlooked or have chosen to ignore.
IV. A Federal Entrapment Statute
As the Abscam prosecutions demonstrate, doctrinal incoherence and ju-
dicial deference to the government's choice of undercover techniques leave
all citizens relatively unprotected against certain investigative abuses.
There are, however, nonjudicial means of restraining abuse by law en-
forcement authorities. One such means is the issuance of administrative
guidelines. For example, in the aftermath of Abscam, the United States
Department of Justice and the FBI issued comprehensive guidelines "to
establish clear and workable procedures for the authorization and review
of undercover operations at appropriate levels in both the FBI and the
and detected, properly should be subject to traditional criminal penalties. Persons who fail honesty
tests conducted at random are in a different category, and perhaps should be dealt with differently.
94. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (requiring a warrant for electronic
eavesdropping); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (listing requirements for valid search
warrant).
95. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 612-13 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert. de-
nied, 102 S. Ct. 906 (1982).
96. Three legislators brought to the agents by the middlemen rejected the bribes. See United
States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aft'd, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982).
97. See H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 419-37 (1966); W. SHIRER, THE RISE
AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 273 (1960).
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Justice Department."98 While the guidelines purport to be "significantly
more restrictive than those required by the law of entrapment or the con-
stitutional principles of due process,"99 the protection they provide, espe-
cially in the context of an operation like Abscam, is illusory. Most signifi-
cantly, they contain no explicit sanctions for noncompliance.
Consequently, there are few incentives for potentially offending officials to
conform their conduct to acceptable investigative behavior. Thus, although
the federal guidelines point in the right direction, they are ultimately of
little practical utility in regulating undercover operations.1'"
Given the present state of affairs, the obligation to curb abuses of inves-
tigative power lies with legislation. The Supreme Court has invited a leg-
islative response0 and the special Senate committee appointed to study
the Abscam investigation has recommended the introduction of legislation
providing for a limited objective entrapment defense.1 0 2 A statutory rem-
98. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ATrORNEY GENERAL'S
GUIDELINES ON FBI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS I (Press Release Jan. 5, 1981) (on file with Yale
Law Journal).
99. Id. at 2.
100. For example, the guidelines attempt to minimize the possibility of overly persistent solicita-
tion by limiting the duration of an undercover operation initially to six months. See Undercover Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 120. While they therefore might prevent an agent from pressuring a target like
Senator Williams for as long as a year until he capitulates, they also might permit an operation to be
extended indefinitely by official authorization. The guidelines also enumerate a dozen "sensitive cir-
cumstances" in which officials should scrutinize the propriety of undercover tactics. These include
situations where agents might have to commit crimes, infiltrate political groups, or penetrate privi-
leged professional or confidential relationships. There are not, however, explicit prohibitions on such
activities; rather there is a requirement that the questionable conduct be authorized by a high-ranking
official. Id. at 116-17.
To be sure, the guidelines could have required a warrant from a judicial officer, instead of high-
level agency approval. Cf Gershman, supra note 92, at 633-37 (proposing warrant for staged arrest).
Practical considerations alone might justify the use of a warrant in an investigation as sensitive as
Abscam. Since a neutral magistrate would not be subject to the internal pressures exerted on an
agency official, advance judicial scrutiny and approval could significantly reduce the potential for
arbitrary and overreaching government conduct. Moreover, the realization that a court had authorized
the operation and that the government had made a responsible attempt to minimize arbitrary behavior
might temper potential public and judicial criticism. It is unlikely, however, that police or prosecuting
officials would subject their plans to judicial approval unless legally required to do so.
The guidelines' treatment of the problem of excessive or persistent offers also is unsatisfactory. The
guidelines require that there be a "reasonable indication" that the undercover operation will reveal
illegal activities, that the criminal nature of the proposed activity be "reasonably clear" to potential
targets, and that the nature of the inducements be "not unjustified" in view of the character of the
illegal transaction. The guidelines, however, do not give content to these standards. See Undercover
Hearings, supra note 3, at 13 (testimony of Professor Louis Seidman).
101. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973).
102. This recommendation largely mirrors the formulations proposed in the Model Penal Code
and the original draft of the new Federal Criminal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962); U.S. NATIONAL COMM. ON REFORM OF FEDERAL LAWS, A PROPOSED NEW
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 702(2) (1971). Under the recommendations contained in the final report
of the Senate Select Committee to Study Undercover Activities of Components of the Department of
Justice, the defendant would be acquitted if he could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he
was induced by government agents to commit an offense and that the government used "methods that
more likely than not would have caused a normally law-abiding citizen to commit a similar offense."
N.Y. Times. Dec. 17, 1982, at A29, col. 1.
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edy would be constitutionally significant for two reasons. First, as a legis-
lative imperative, it would overcome the judiciary's oft-expressed reluc-
tance to review the conduct of law enforcement authorities. Second, it
would help safeguard the individual rights of citizens by curbing the ex-
cesses of those authorities. To do this, however, the statutory scheme must
provide both principled limitations on government solicitation of criminal
activity and clear, logical standards by which to evaluate that conduct.
These goals can be most effectively accomplished by constructing a statute
that requires the fact-finder to analyze the government's undercover tech-
niques rather than the defendant's mental state and that specifically man-
dates consideration of whether the methods used were unreasonable,
whether the law enforcement operation was initiated in bad faith, and
whether the actions taken in the course of the investigation caused or
threatened substantial harm to individuals and society. A statute that per-
mits this inquiry will fill the analytic gap currently found in entrapment
doctrine. By way of a preliminary contribution to this effort, I propose the
following statutory language:
Unlawful Entrapment
A law enforcement official or his agent commits unlawful entrap-
ment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence for a criminal prosecu-
tion he induces any person to engage in criminal activity by methods
that are unreasonable or undertaken in bad faith, or that cause or
threaten substantial harm to individuals or society, or that induces a
nondisposed person to engage in criminal activity.
Definitions
1. Induce: A law enforcement agent induces another person to en-
gage in criminal activity if the agent initiates, instigates, or otherwise
proposes the criminal activity.
2. Nondisposed: An individual is nondisposed to engage in crime
when, prior to being induced, he is not reasonably suspected of en-
gaging in, nor reasonably suspected of intending to engage in, crimi-
nal activity.
3. Unreasonable Methods: Unreasonable investigative methods in-
clude, but are not limited to:
(a) violations of individual constitutional rights; or
(b) excessive and unwarranted intrusions on confidential, privi-
leged, or protected relationships; or
(c) the unexcused commission of crime by law enforcement offi-
cials or their agents; or
(d) the use of inducements that would cause a normally law-abid-
ing person to engage in criminal activity.
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4. Bad Faith: Bad faith may be demonstrated by, but is not lim-
ited to:
(a) showing that the predominant purpose of a law enforcement
operation was to induce nondisposed persons to engage in criminal
activity; or
(b) showing that government officials failed to use reasonable pro-
cedures to ascertain whether inducements were offered only to indi-
viduals currently engaged in, or reasonably suspected of engaging in,
criminal activity; or
(c) showing that the law enforcement agent induced criminal ac-
tivity for reasons demonstrably unrelated to legitimate law enforce-
ment objectives; or
(d) showing that government officials failed to use reasonable pro-
cedures to minimize the likelihood of causing substantial harm.
5. Substantial Harm: Substantial harm includes, but is not limited
to:
(a) serious injury to any person; or
(b) excessive and unwarranted damage to the property of any per-
son; or
(c) excessive and uncontrolled distribution of contraband or dan-
gerous substances.
The inquiry into governmental conduct expresses our intuitions of the
principled bases upon which law enforcement officials should conduct
their activities. The "reasonableness" criterion will encourage courts to
avoid the unsatisfactory "end-justifies-the-means" analysis employed by
the Abscam courts.1 03 The substantial harm test allows the court to con-
sider the independent effects of undercover operations and to punish con-
duct inimical to the interests of society. The bad faith inquiry goes a step
further and punishes impermissible techniques or motives on the govern-
ment's part even if substantial harm or nondisposition cannot be shown.
The "bad faith" inquiry thus provides an additional incentive for execu-
tive officers to conduct undercover investigations responsibly.
By requiring some reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the statute
allows courts to dispense with the predisposition inquiry and to use in-
stead the concept of "reasonable suspicion" to test whether an individual
is "nondisposed." Reasonable suspicion is a standard lower than the
Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause for warrantless ar-
103. The reasonableness standard is used elsewhere as a test of the constitutionality of investiga-
tive techniques that intrude into citizens' lives. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1957)
(due process requires "evaluation based on a disinterested inquiry"); United States v. Brown, 635
F.2d 1207, 1214 (6th Cir. 1980) (police decision to allow commission of crimes to catch other mem-
bers of burglary ring not violation of due process).
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rests and searches.'" Rather, it is the level of knowledge that permits a
police officer constitutionally to stop and question a person on a public
street.105 The statute thus contemplates that the selection of an investiga-
tion's target be decided on a factual basis similar to that required when
the government routinely confronts citizens in public. Since undercover
operations frequently are far more intrusive and of longer duration than a
cursory stop on a public street, the standard allows the government a fair
degree of latitude without permitting it to intrude on the lives of innocent
individuals.
There are considerable advantages to the use of this statute. While fo-
cusing attention on the government methods themselves, the statute never-
theless affords ample flexibilty in the achievement of legitimate law en-
forcement goals. The statute plainly presupposes that undercover
operations are a necessary and permissible method of crime detection, par-
ticularly where covert crimes such as narcotics offenses or corruption are
the objects of the investigation. 106 For example, it would not prohibit
traditional "sting" operations nor preclude government agents from infil-
trating ongoing criminal activity. In the former instance, the undercover
objective is to create a fictitious entity that provides a ready criminal op-
portunity for persons already engaged in criminal activity or seeking to
engage in such activity. The. "sting" consists of controlling the simulated
conditions whereby evidence of guilt may be established. With the infiltra-
tion, the undercover agent does not solicit but presumably merely partici-
pates in ongoing criminal activity. What the statute does prohibit, how-
ever, is the offering of inducements by government officials to persons not
reasonably suspected of criminal activity.
The statutory proposal leaves unanswered certain procedural questions
as to who bears the burden of going forward or the risk of nonpersuasion
on the various elements of the defense.107 My own view is that both the
burden of going forward and the risk of nonpersuasion on the issue of
government misconduct should be placed on the defendant. Placing the
evidentary burden upon the defendant would be constitutional since en-
trapment does not negate an element of the crime and so does not ease the
government's burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.108 By raising the defense, the defendant ordinarily admits
104. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-13 (1959).
105. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27 (1.968); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417-18 (1981) (warrantless stopping of vehicle permissible where facts afford objective basis for
suspicion).
106. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n.7 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring);
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973).
107. See supra note 74 for the allocation of burdens under present entrapment law.
108. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (due process clause protects accused against
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that he committed the acts necessary for criminal liability and is not seek-
ing to justify or excuse his conduct. Rather, the defendant is seeking to
object to the methods used by the government official in tempting him into
a crime that he otherwise would not have committed. Since the defense is
not constitutionally mandated, a legislature might consider it a fairer and
presumably more attractive compromise to provide an ameliorative defense
but to require the beneficiary to bear the burden of proof at least on some
elements.1" 9 Other principles of burden allocation, like access to the rele-
vant proof, might, of course, dictate an opposite result.110
An application of my proposed statute probably would have produced
decidedly different results in the Abscam cases. First, proof that persons
who were not reasonably suspected of engaging in criminal activity were
induced to commit crimes would constitute unlawful entrapment. Since
most courts concluded that the government had no apparent factual basis
to suspect any defendant of engaging in crime at the time he was ap-
proached, the entrapment defense would be successful. Second, the nature
and amount of the inducements offered-particularly to Williams, Jan-
notti, and Schwartz-might be viewed as sufficiently excessive as to in-
duce normally law-abiding persons to respond criminally. Accordingly,
such inducements would constitute an "unreasonable method" under the
statute and constitute an unlawful entrapment. Finally, if the govern-
ment's predominant purpose was to induce nondisposed persons like
Kelly, Jannotti, and Schwartz to engage in criminal activity, or if the op-
eration was unrelated to legitimate law enforcement goals, as Judge Ful-
lam concluded in United States v. Jannotti, then the government's "bad
faith" would provide a separate basis for finding unlawful entrapment.
Conclusion
Abscam raised complex and troubling questions about our constitu-
tional form of government. The investigation may have uncovered latent
corruption, but at the cost of possibly impairing the integrity of other leg-
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute crime).
While there remains a question as to which facts are covered by the reasonable doubt rule, compare
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 624 (1975) (invalidating state statute requiring the defendant to prove
provocation as defense to murder), with Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 497 (1977) (upholding state
statute requiring defendant to prove "extreme emotional disturbance" as defense to murder), it is
fairly clear that issues not going to the defendant's culpability fall outside the rule's scope. See Under-
wood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J.
1299, 1343 (1977).
109. See People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 306, 347 N.E.2d 898, 910, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 584
(1976) (Brietel, C.J., concurring); Underwood, supra note 108, at 1331-32.
110. See Underwood, supra note 108, at 1333-36 (explaining rationale of burden allocation in
alibi defense). See generally Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in the
Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979) (suggesting framework for determining constitutionality of
defenses and presumptions in criminal law).
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islators and the legislative process generally. And the judicial branch,
while purporting to balance the executive's use of power against constitu-
tional commands, failed to articulate constitutional or legal restraints on
the government's undercover methods.
Restoring the balance of power is now the responsibility of Congress.
Through legislation aimed at curbing excesses of law enforcement power,
Congress has the opportunity to provide principled and meaningful stan-
dards to limit the misuse of such power, as well as to provide a means for
citizens to vindicate claims of abuse.
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